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THE REDISCOVERY OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
BY THE JAPANESE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP)
Over the last three decades, Asian countries continue to deepen “mar-
ket-led” integration with a heavy dose of regional cooperation to a degree 
far exceeding anything being currently contemplated in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC). The issues being addressed within Asian regional in-
tegration frameworks go beyond market-integration, with a development 
agenda specifically including issues such as industrial development and ag-
glomeration, competitiveness, innovation, R&D, infrastructure building, and 
sustainable development among others (ECLAC, 2010a). Thus, in Asia, mar-
ket-integration and cooperation have been mutually complementary and rein-
forcing. This favorable outcome, in turn, has often been facilitated by Japan’s 
trade-cum-investment plus cooperation engagement in that region. 
Cooperation has been an integral part of the Japan-Asia relationship, 
demonstrating how interactions in the private sector open space for govern-
ment-to-government cooperation, and vice versa. This might be baptized as 
the “Japan Model of Economic Engagement”. What is less known, howev-
er, is that Japan has also been pursuing the same strategy in several Latin 
American countries, in some cases even longer than in Asian countries, with 
admirable results. These experiences can be perfectly expandable to other 
Latin American countries. 
The growing economic interdependence with the Asia-Pacific, together with 
the debt crisis of the 1980s, left Japan little room to consider the LAC region 
as a strategic partner. At the outbreak of the crisis (August 1982), Japanese 
banks were engaged in private-sector financing operations worth over US$30 
billion, including over US$13 billion syndicated loans (Stallings, 1990; ECLAC, 
1996, 1990). At that time, Japanese banks were also participants in the re-
gion’s largest projects such as Peruvian oil pipelines and metallurgical indus-
try in Mexico. The debt crisis meant that the Government of Japan was called 
to use large sums of public money to participate in the bailout plan (ECLAC, 
1988). As a result of the crisis, some Japanese firms were forced to pull out of 
the region entirely, while many others decided to stay. All this happened at the 
time when Asia was becoming a better option for Japan.
However, LAC has returned to Japan’s list of foreign policy priorities in recent 
years. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tour to the region in May 2014, the first in 
10 years by a Japanese head of state, called for strengthening of bilateral 
relations, based on the public private partnership (PPP) with Japan. Foreign 
Minister Fumio Kishida traveled to the region on three occasions since 2013. 
His trip to Cuba in 2015 marked the first ever visit by a Japanese foreign 
minister. Japan has maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba over the years, 
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irrespective of the Revolution, and has been involved in the external debt re-
scheduling of the island nation in recent years. All these visits reflect Japan’s 
renewed interests in LAC. 
The major motivations behind the recent rediscovery by Japan of the region 
include, among others, LAC’s quick and sustained recovery from the 2008-09 
financial crisis, coupled by high and stable economic growth, domestic mar-
ket expansion, and significant improvements in employment and poverty indi-
cators in the post-crisis period. In addition, LAC’s GDP is 2.5 times larger than 
the ASEAN’s, with 600 million inhabitants with a burgeoning middle-class. The 
region’s endowment of natural resources is second to none; Japan looks to 
LAC as a major player in securing stable and safe natural-resources. LAC is 
also endowed with a third of the world’s potential farming areas and fresh-
water reserves, and 20% of the surface area of natural forests and abundant 
biodiversity. The last, but not least in importance is that Japan shares with a 
majority of LAC countries the basic values in the realm of both economics 
(market-economy) and politics (democracy, human rights and rule of law). 
Japan’s commercial engagement has intensified over the years with those 
Latin American countries that share these values.
Japan has been an important trading partner, lender, investor and ODA donor 
in LAC for decades. While bilateral merchandize trade between Japan and LAC 
has been overshadowed by China’s ascendance in recent years, Japan was 
the largest Asian trading partner for a majority of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries up to the turn of the century. In contrast to a standstill in bilateral trade, 
Japanese financial flows to the region continue to grow. In sum, the economic 
relationship between Japan and LAC is much deeper and diversified than sim-
ple trade statistics might suggest. Although the bilateral trade relations can be 
still described as a typical Asia-LAC pattern of an “inter-industry” nature in which 
the latter exports commodities and their processed goods to the former, in ex-
change of a variety of manufactures, merchandize trade flows do not capture all 
facets of the bilateral economic and commercial relationship. 
Japan has been one of the most important sources of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) for the region; Japanese investments, especially over the past 
decade, have targeted an increasingly diverse and technologically-intensive 
range of sectors in LAC. In response to rising income levels in Latin American 
countries, Japanese companies have begun to target several durable goods 
sectors such as automobiles and their parts, as well as consumers’ goods 
and services such as cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and 
alcoholic drinks like beer whose demand are on a rise. 
This investment, which has likely acted as a substitute for trade in some cas-
es, brings a number of benefits for LAC countries: cutting-edge technology, 
know-how, employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings (IDB, 
2013). In some cases, Japanese companies have become major exporters 
from their production bases in LAC not only to Japanese markets but also to 
third countries including China, the United States, the European Union and 
the proper LAC region. As a matter of fact, exports to third country markets 
by Japanese companies’ subsidiaries and affiliates operating in the region 
exceed by far LAC’s bilateral exports to Japan.
Japan has been a major source of development finance for the LAC region. 
The scale of Japan’s Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) operations in 
LAC rivals those of major multilateral institutions and Chinese policy banks. 
The region has accounted for 20% of JBIC’s annual outstanding commitments 
in recent years. While a considerable percentage of JBIC overseas lending 
supports the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by Japanese firms, 
Japan’s official loans to LAC also support manufacturing, and its share is 
increasing. JBIC has shown a strong disposition towards governments with 
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market-friendly economic policies. Nonetheless, JBIC’s contributions repre-
sent only a fraction of aggregate Japanese finance in the LAC region; Japa-
nese commercial bank claims on LAC are large and rising. 
Japan enjoys close historical ties with Latin America and the Caribbean. Ap-
proximately 1.8 million citizens of Japanese descent live in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Today, these communities overseas play prominent roles in 
agriculture, health, education and politics in a number of Latin American coun-
tries. The Nikkei have also been involved in work undertaken by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), whose emphasis has now shifted 
to poverty reduction, natural-disaster prevention, inclusive and sustainable 
development in areas such as education, health and agricultural as well as 
environmental protection. Foreign nationals of Japanese descent living or 
working in Japan, estimated approximately 300,000 persons, have also made 
significant contributions to the strengthening of economic and social ties. The 
Nikkei communities also have become an important force in shaping new Ja-
pan-Latin American relations.
The Japanese private sector and government have been coordinating their 
efforts in pursuit of a public-private partnership (PPP) to capitalize on oppor-
tunities in the region. This takes place against the backdrop of intensifying 
competition with China and the Republic of Korea, and increasingly with In-
dia and several ASEAN countries. To establish and strengthen competitive-
ness of Japanese companies in the region, Japan has signed three bilateral 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Chile, Mexico and Peru and 
is currently in negotiation with Colombia. EPAs may therefore be viewed as 
part and parcel of a policy of support for broadening production networks and 
value chains. Japan is also engaged in the TPP, which includes the three Latin 
American APEC member countries (Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Since January 
2013, Japan has been participating in the Pacific Alliance as one of the first 
“observer” countries of the group. 
Cristina Negoita / Shutterstock.com
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In addition, very recently, there has emerged a possibility of creating an EPA 
with Brazil. Although it has been considered difficult to negotiate an EPA bilat-
erally with an individual Mercosur member country under its present Customs 
Union format, Japan’s Keidanren (Japan Business Federation)1 and Brazilian 
National Industry Federation (CNI) recently prepared a report calling for an 
EPA between the two countries. The report was submitted to the 19th “Ja-
pan-Brazil Joint Economic Committee” meeting held at Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
September 1, 2015. At the meeting, both sides agreed to request the respec-
tive governments to consider negotiating an EPA at an early date (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 2015). Despite a current economic slowdown in Brazil, major Japa-
nese companies continue to show a strong interest in strengthening relations 
with Brazil’s business community.
The type of economic partnership agreements signed by Japan set out from 
the premise that free trade is not enough and that trade liberalization has to 
be complemented by cooperation. The Japanese authorities are increasingly 
aware that greater market-driven economic integration will not happen without 
measures to promote and support it; it requires not only trade liberalization 
and harmonization of rules and standards, but also cooperation. The Japa-
nese ODA model that has been applied in Asia and elsewhere emphasizes 
those typical elements of ODA such as infrastructure improvements and hu-
man resource training, with a view to transforming the production sector and 
promoting trade and investment.    
Japan has become an important source of regional development cooperation. 
An increasing number of Japanese companies consider the LAC region as a 
strategic base for their global operations. The attention of the Japanese pri-
vate sector increasingly focuses on the region’s natural resources and ener-
gy, enlargement of domestic markets for industries (automobiles, ITC, foods, 
cosmetics and pharmaceuticals etc.), infrastructure and food security, envi-
ronmental protection and natural-disaster prevention, industry agglomeration 
and supporting industry development, and rural and social (education and 
health in particular) development. These cooperation efforts are sometimes 
undertaken in close collaboration with regional integration schemes such as 
the Mercosur, the Central American Integration System (SICA), the CARICOM, 
and now more likely with the Pacific Alliance. While Japan’s focus on natural 
resources and “hard” infrastructure continues, this orientation is being com-
plemented by “soft”, knowledge–intensive, socially “inclusive” projects.
Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed significant changes in the 
landscape of financing for development. These changes include the expand-
ing financial capabilities of emerging economies and middle income countries, 
and also the increase of private investment flow to developing countries. This 
observation is particularly relevant for Latin American and Caribbean econ-
omies, majority of which are considered to be higher middle-income coun-
tries. Future needs of these countries for development finance will depend 
less on ODA and more on private investment funds, external and internal alike 
(ECLAC, 2015b). Japan is expected to play an important role in implementing 
the United Nations Post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agenda 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the LAC region. 
With a view to addressing the new and continuing challenges of the Unit-
ed Nations post-2015 era, Japan is pursuing various initiatives to achieve 
“quality” growth, which specifically means inclusive, sustainable and resilient 
growth for all, and thereby to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. Japan will 
do so based on the concept of human security in accordance with its guiding 
principle and by applying the new Development Cooperation Charter adopt-
1 The Keidanren is an economic organization with a membership comprised of 1,329 representative com-
panies of Japan, 109 nationwide industrial associations and 47 regional economic organizations.
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ed in February 2015. Japan is promoting wide-ranging partnerships with the 
private sector in the fields of trade, finance, and technology, while utilizing 
ODA as a catalyst to enhance such activities. Japan has also transformed into 
a major development-finance source for multilateral development banks and 
agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. This 
new focus of Japan on development finance bodes quite well with the post-
2015 vision of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Trade and investment relations between Japan and Latin 
America and the Caribbean
Historically, from the LAC perspective, Japan has been more important 
in the realm of investment than in trade. Although Japan was the most im-
portant trading partner of the Asia-Pacific region during the 1980s and the 
1990s, reciprocal trade volume was relatively small when compared with Ja-
pan’s greater stake in foreign direct investment (FDI) and private and official 
loans destined to LAC. It is estimated that by the end of the 1980s, Japan’s 
17% of cumulative FDI and 18% of private bank debt was concentrated in the 
region (ECLAC, 1996). However, financial flows fell sharply during the follow-
ing decade. This contrasts sharply with the global trend, especially with that 
observed for the US investors. Sharp declines in financial markets and the 
prolonged decline in industrial production have affected the flows of Japanese 
FDI at that time.
Trade
Japan and LAC have been important trading partners for decades, a 
strong contrast to LAC’s trade with the rest of Asia, whose trade has only 
reached significant levels since the turn of the century. Although the ascen-
dance of China as a major force in LAC trade has overshadowed the dy-
namics of LAC-Japan trade, commercial ties between Japan and LAC have 
evolved and diversified over five decades. From an initial focus on minerals 
and agriculture, the relationship now encompasses a much broader spec-
trum of trade-cum-investment links and government -to-government coop-
eration that have laid the foundations for the development of various sectors 
in the LAC region. 
Admittedly, reciprocal trade between Japan and LAC has been quite cyclical 
over the last 50 years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the trade relations between Ja-
pan and LAC recorded growth of 15% and 19% respectively as an annual av-
erage. Due to the economic problems faced by LAC countries in the first half 
of the 1980s, the trade growth rate declined to 2%. In the decade of the 1990s, 
the reciprocal trade was characterized by an asymmetry in which Japanese 
imports from LAC sharply reduced, while its exports to the region increased 
steadily, resulting in a growing surplus for Japan; imports from LAC grew 
with average annual rates of -1.0% during 1990-1994, compared with a rate 
of 8.7% for the period 1985-1989. Later on, reciprocal trade recovered and 
continued to growth until 1998-1999 when Latin American economies were 
severely affected by the Asian financial crisis. After hitting the trough in 2004, 
reciprocal trade continued to recover until the outbreak of the international 
financial crisis of 2008. In the post-crisis period, reciprocal trade remained 
relatively stagnant (Figure 1A and 1B). 
As observed in LAC trade with other countries and regions, trade performance 
of Japan has been heavily influenced by both business cycles of trading part-
ners and external factors. LAC’s importance as a trading partner for Japan has 
evolved accordingly in relation with the above-mentioned business cycles and 
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economic-financial crises. Despite ups and downs, however, the LAC market 
accounts for roughly 5% of Japan’s total exports and 4% of the country’s im-
ports over the 35 year span (see Figure 1B). Therefore, the region continues to 
be Japan’s significant trading partner. In 2014, Japan’s exports to and imports 
from LAC amounted to US$33.8 and US$30.4 billion, accounting for 4.9% and 
3.7% of the country’s total exports and imports, respectively. 
Figure 1. Japan’s Trade with Latin America and the Caribbean 1980-2014
(Percentages)
A: Annual growth rates, 1980-2014 B: LAC share in Japan’s total 
 (five year periods)  exports and imports, 1980-2014
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on UN COMTRADE database.
It should be noted that Japan was the largest Asian trading partner (both in 
exports and imports) for the LAC region as a whole until 2003, when China 
for the first time displaced Japan as Asia-Pacific’s main trading partner in that 
region. In fact, Japan accounted for 62% and 73% of total LAC exports and 
imports with the Asia-Pacific region in 1991, respectively. In 2002, Japanese 
bilateral trade (exports and imports) with LAC totaled US$23 billion, surpass-
ing US$20 billion of the Chinese trade with LAC that year. As seen in Figure 
2A and 2B, the displacement of Japan by China was accelerated during the 
LAC’s “Golden Age” (2003~2008) and in the post-crisis period until 2013, 
when LAC’s exports to China started to slowdown. 
Figure 2. Shares in total LAC trade with the Asia-Pacific, by major trading partners, 1981-2014
(In percentages of total LAC exports/imports to and from Asia-Pacific, percentages)
A. Exports B. Imports
 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on UN COMTRADE database.
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In 2014, Japan’s share in total LAC exports and imports with Asia-Pacific 
stood at 13.2% and 11.6%, respectively, slightly below the figures recorded by 
the ASEAN(10) group. China’s bilateral trade (exports and imports combined) 
with LAC reached US$254 billion in 2014, five times Japan’s trade with the 
region of US$54 billion, or ASEAN (10) total of US$57 billion. Japan’s trade, 
however, surpassed Korea’s total of US$45 billion and India’s total of US$31 
billion (Figure 2AB). In short, whereas Japan was the main trading partner 
(both supplier and buyer) from the region in the 1980s and 1990s, China is 
currently the predominant partner for both exports and imports. In terms of 
imports into LAC from Asia-Pacific, China’s penetration is unparalleled: almost 
two-thirds of LAC imports from Asia-Pacific come from China.
In the 1980s and 1990s and the beginning of the new century, Japan was a 
significant export destination for several Latin American countries: Japan was 
the most important export destination for Chile (16.6% of Chilean exports were 
absorbed by the Japanese market); the second most important after the Unit-
ed States in Peru (8.7%); the third in Mexico (3.2%); and the fourth for Brazil 
(6.4%) and Colombia (3.2%) in 1993 (ECLAC, 1996). The growing importance 
of Japan as a trading partner, along with other Asian countries, aroused the 
interests of the Latin American countries on the Pacific Rim in participating 
more actively in institutions such as the Economic Council of the Pacific Basin 
(PBEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Asia-Pa-
cific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It is not surprising that the date of joining 
the APEC for Chile (1993), Mexico (1993) and Peru (1998) coincides with Ja-
pan’s rise in the LAC trade sphere.
 Shutterstock.com
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China’s recent predominance in Asia-LAC trade might lead one to think that 
China is currently the most important export market for all the Latin American 
countries. However, contrary to what is generally expected, Japan still main-
tains the No. 1 position as the most important Asian export destination for a 
number of Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay 
in South America, and Nicaragua and the El Salvador and Panama in Central 
America (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Latin America: export distribution to Asia, by major destinations
2011-2014 average
(As percentage of each Latin American country’s total exports to Asia-Pacific, %)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Comtrade and other sources
LAC exports to Japan are more diversified than to China; Chile, Brazil, Mexico 
and Peru, by the order of importance, together accounted for 86% of LAC total 
exports to Japan during 2011-2014 (see Figure 4A). Similarly, in the case of 
LAC exports to China, the same four Latin American countries figure as the top 
four LAC exporters with a combined share of 87%. In the latter case, however, 
the export structure is more concentrated; Brazil accounts for half of LAC’s 
total exports to China (Figure 4B). In contrast, in the case of LAC’s exports 
to Japan, Chile and Brazil share the first place with each accounting for 34%, 
followed by Mexico (10%) and Peru (9%). In recent years, the share of Chile 
and Brazil tends to decline, while that of Mexico is rising.
Figure 4. LAC Exports to Japan and China, by major exporters, 2011-2014 Average
(In percentages of total LAC exports to Japan and China)
A.To Japan B. To China
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Comtrade and other sources.
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It is of great importance that LAC trade is more balanced with Japan than with 
China. For a large number of Latin American countries, trade balance with 
Japan is positive, and when it is negative, the deficit is much smaller than with 
the Chinese case. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Venezuela registered 
a small deficit with Japan during 2011-2014 on average, while Japan’s largest 
deficit was recorded with Brazil (US$26 billion). In contrast, with the exception 
of Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela who recorded a sur-
plus, LAC countries register a large deficit with China. The increasing deficits 
are a result of rapid penetration of Chinese products into LAC domestic mar-
kets. Though Mexico exports to China more than to Japan, Mexico’s rapidly 
growing imports from China results in an increasingly large trade deficit for 
the Azteca country. In fact, almost 70% of China’s total trade deficit with LAC 
(US$77 billion) as a whole originates from Mexico. 
LAC’s export basket to Japan is less concentrated by product than the re-
gion’s exports to China.2 In Japan’s case, copper ores and concentrates, iron 
ore, meat and edible meat, maize, coffee, fish, aluminum, pulpwood, crude 
petroleum, and pig and sponge iron comprise the ten major export products, 
which accounted for 73% of total exports to Japan in 2013 (see Figure 5). In 
the case of China, the five major products including seeds and oleaginous 
(soybeans and oil), iron ore, copper ores and concentrates, refined copper 
and crude petroleum represented more than 77% of LAC’s total exports. Al-
though LAC’s overall export baskets to Japan and other Asian markets are 
similar, an important difference between the two countries lies in fuels; these 
products account for roughly 11% of LAC exports to China, whereas in the 
Japan-LAC case, the corresponding figure is 2%. In turn LAC exports to Japan 
have a larger agriculture and fishery component.
Figure 5. Latin American Exports to Japan and China, by major product groups, 2013
(In percentages of total LAC exports to Japan and China)
A. To Japan B. To China
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Comtrade and other sources.
2 According to a commonly accepted measure of market concentration, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which takes into account the full range of exports, the HHI for Japan is 0.1209, while that for China 
is 0.1339. The smaller is the index number, the lesser concentrated the market is (These figures are 
calculated by the Author).
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In addition, LAC’s exports to Japan consist not only of traditional commod-
ities and their processed goods, but non-traditional primary products such 
as salmon, wine, meats, orange juice, fresh flowers, processed wood and 
other products. LAC countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile have become 
a major source to satisfy import needs of chicken and pork meats in Japan. 
Mexico, together with Peru, is a major supplier of asparagus, avocado and 
mango to the Japanese market. More than 90% of imports of salmon, the fish 
of the largest domestic consumption in Japan, are met from Chile. Colombia 
has become a major provider of fresh flowers for Japan. Sushi shops in Japan 
are increasingly dependent on Mexican tuna supplies. In addition, LAC has 
established undisputed positions as suppliers of non-traditional minerals and 
metals. Two-thirds of Japan’s increasing demand on molybdenum is being 
satisfied from Chile and Mexico. Japan meets most of its lithium needs from 
Chile and Argentina.  
It should be noted that Latin America has established a strong foothold in 
Japanese mineral and metal markets, but not in agriculture. Japan sources 
almost half of non-ferrous ores and metals and 30% of iron ore imports from 
Latin America. Though to a lesser extent, Japan’s reliance on cereals imports 
from Latin American is relatively high (22%). In contrast, the country sources 
relatively little meats, fruits, vegetables and wood products from Latin America 
(Figure 6). This is due in part to a strong competition that Latin American pro-
 Shutterstock.com
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ducers face in agricultural products from Australia, the United States, Canada, 
New Zealand, as well as several Asian developing countries. In the case of 
coffee, a product traditionally reserved for Latin American exporters, for ex-
ample, is now open to severe competition with Vietnamese producers. Given 
that Japan’s self-sufficiency (calculated in calorie-intakes terms) in agricultural 
products is below 40%, the prospects for future imports are promising. 
A relatively low share of LAC in Japan’s agricultural import markets is not neces-
sarily a result of high levels of protection that Japan applies on agricultural im-
ports; customs duties on many agricultural products are zero or low, and when 
they are applied, it is done on a most-favor nations (MFN) basis. In addition, 
tariff escalation, in which tariffs rise in proportion to a good’s level of processing, 
is not an insignificant concern for LAC exporters to Japan (IDB, 2013). It is rather 
a question of conscientious public-and private partnership (PPP) efforts by the 
exporting country. Colombia’s strong and sustained presence in the Japanese 
coffee market is a good example of such efforts. When import barriers exist, 
they tend to be sanitary or phytosanitary concerns that prevent Latin American 
products from entering the Japanese markets. When market-access is restrict-
ed by quotas or tariff-quotas, the widening of these quotas can be negotiated 
under an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan.
Figure 6. Latin America: Share in Japan’s total imports by major product groups 2013
(As percentage of each imported product)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from Statistical Yearbook of Japan, Statistical Bureau.
Over the years, Japan has established in LAC a strong manufacturing base 
in sectors such as automobiles and electronics. Japanese companies ope-
rating in these sectors serve both the domestic and third export markets, 
contributing to employment and boosting LAC’s trade balance and foreign 
exchange earnings. These overseas transactions by Japanese companies’ 
subsidiaries and affiliates do not figure in LAC-Japan bilateral trade sta-
tistics. For example, Japanese automakers accounted for nearly 35% of 
Mexico’s car production in 2014, of which 80% were exported to third mar-
kets (PricewaterhouseCoopers Co., 2015). With the expansion of production 
capacities planned in this sector, third country exports from Mexico are ex-
pected to grow in the future. A strong presence of the Japanese companies 
in this sector and others suggests that some Latin American countries are 
beginning to integrate, albeit sporadically, into the extensive supply-chain 
networks prevalent in the Asia-Pacific, North America and Europe. LAC’s 
engagement with Japan should further facilitate this process.
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One feature that distinguishes Japan-LAC trade from that of China is that LAC 
imports from Japan are less likely to be in direct competition with LAC’s pro-
per production and exports in third markets, given Japan’s export basket 
is heavily concentrated in high-technology, capital intensive sectors. This 
contrasts to the case of China, where a number of studies have shown that 
significant market penetration by Chinese imports often pose a direct com-
petitive threat for LAC manufacturing producers, especially of sectors such 
as steel products, textiles and clothing, footwear, domestic appliances and 
tires, in both domestic and third markets. In fact, since the beginning of the 
recent global crisis, many countries including some in LAC have initiated 
anti-dumping investigations into imports from China (ECLAC, 2011). In con-
trast, Japan has rarely been the target of antidumping measures from LAC, 
and in any event the most recent case against Japan was initiated over a 
decade ago (IAB, 2013).
Another feature that differentiates the Japan-LAC trade from that of China is 
the important role that large general trading companies (sogo-shosha) play in 
moving merchandize and services between LAC and third countries, activities 
that are not captured in the LAC-Japan bilateral trade statistics; the economic 
relationship is deeper and more diversified than simple bilateral trade flows 
might indicate. These companies, either directly or through subsidiaries op-
erating in the region, play a critical intermediary role in moving raw materials 
such as minerals and grains from their source in the region to destination 
countries in Asia, especially China (ECLAC, 2010a; IDB, 2013). 
More importantly, these companies also act as investment banks, participat-
ing directly in the management of the firms they invest in, or co-finance proj-
ects with other firms of Japanese or non-Japanese origins. Examples of in-
vestment projects financed by these companies in LAC abound. A significant 
part of their global business resources are sourced from third countries and 
this often leads to underestimate the magnitude of investment by Japanese 
companies in the LAC region. In addition to boosting trade between LAC and 
third countries, these companies bring not only logistical, marketing and dis-
tribution expertise but also significant investment and finance resources to the 
region (ECLAC, 2010a; IAB, 2013).  
The Japanese public sector has played a major role in introducing non-tra-
ditional exports by Latin American countries to Japanese and other markets. 
Government activities have often taken the form of cooperation projects to 
help firms in the region develop export potential and develop capacities to 
supply Japanese and other markets. In fact, Japan has been behind some of 
the region’s emblematic export success stories, such as Chilean salmon (Ho-
sono, 2010), Brazilian soybeans and maize (Hongo and Hosono, 2012) and 
agricultural product supply-chain projects in Paraguay (JICA/ECLAC, 2014), 
in addition to the development of local supply chains in Mexico’s automo-
tive sector. Such achievements are a result of efforts based on interactions 
between Japan’s public-private partnership (PPP) efforts and those of Latin 
American counterparts. Governments on both sides have played a catalyst 
role in shaping the bilateral relationships, ensuring that opportunities will di-
versify by sector and market, and that trade and investment in new areas in 
fact be materialized. 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in LAC has a long trajectory and its 
origin can be traced back to the pre-WWII period. In the 1960s, Japanese firms 
invested in the region to secure the inputs needed for industrial production, 
and participated in large mining projects, mostly in Brazil and Chile. By 1965 
the LAC region was the largest recipient of Japanese FDI, with 25% of the 
world accumulated total. The focus on raw materials soon changed, however, 
as Japanese investment during the 1970s and 1980s shifted to manufacturing 
operations in low cost locations. The larger projects involving Japanese capi-
tal in LAC at those times were concentrated in Brazil and Mexico, with the idea 
of benefitting from the scale of their domestic markets as well as from oppor-
tunities for exporting manufactured products to neighboring markets in order 
to avoid protectionist measures. Some emblematic projects were undertaken 
during these periods.3 Of the 363 Japanese companies who had invested in 
Brazil by 1984, approximately half of them operated in manufacturing and the 
rest in commerce, services, construction and finance. In Mexico, 77 of the 126 
Japanese companies worked in manufacturing (ECLAC, 1990). 
In the 1980s, Japan became one of the world’s most important sources of 
FDI, stimulated mainly by the sharp appreciation of the yen, the increase in 
labor costs in the country, and growing trade restrictions abroad, which led 
Japanese companies to seek production bases overseas. As a result, FDI 
flows from Japan in 1989 reached its maximum level of US$67.5 billion. How-
ever, the timing of this “second-wave” of Japanese outward investment world-
wide unfortunately coincided with the prolonged debt crisis in the LAC region. 
Japan, immersed in the debt-recycling exercises, looked elsewhere for their 
investment opportunities, while LAC was almost absent from the Japanese 
FDI boom. In fact, Japanese manufacturing FDI outflows increased ten times 
during 1980 and 1995 worldwide, while LAC’s share in this investment dropped 
from 15% to 2% (IAB, 2013). Towards the 1990s, the implementation of liber-
alization and deregulation reforms, together with the privatization programs, 
improved growth prospects of Latin American countries and stimulated FDI in 
the region. Nonetheless, neither liberalization of investment regulations, nor 
the process of privatization, nor the establishment of debt conversion mecha-
nisms was a sufficient incentive for Japanese investors to return to the region. 
Strong growth in Latin America beginning in the early 2000s made the region 
a natural destination for Japanese companies once again. Between 2003 and 
2008, regional GDP growth averaged nearly 5% per year, with per capita GDP 
increasing by over 3% per annum. The ramparts that the countries of the re-
gion had built through sounder macroeconomic policy management during 
this period made it possible for the region to weather the international crisis 
with unprecedented resilience and to emerge from it sooner and more stron-
gly than the developed countries. 
3 The emblematic examples included: the Ushiminas steelworks in Brazil in which Japanese financing 
totaled US$760 million; the Tubarao steelworks, financed with mixed capital from Japan (Kawasaki Steel 
Co. and others), Italy and Brazil, with an investment of US$168 million or 24.5% of the total; aluminum 
production in the Amazon with Japanese investment of US$273 million or 49% of the total; two pulp and 
paper mills in Minas Gerais and Espiritu with an investment of US$100 million; the agricultural develop-
ment project of the wide zone of Cerrado with US$450 million. In Mexico, Nissan Motor Co. employed 
close to 5,000 workers. In 1985 two major steelwork projects were completed with substantial Japanese 
investment. Sumitomo Metal Industries and other Japanese companies invested US$20 million (at the 
1985 exchange rate) or 40% of the total, in the construction of a large diameter pipe plant, while Kobe 
Steel and other companies invested US$22 million in constructing of a plant of large-sized cast and 
forged steel products. These collaboration schemes were proposed as an integral part of the expansion 
plan of the SICARTSA steelworks plant, for which Japan had already granted a credit of US$110 million 
(ECLAC, 1990).         
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The region’s growth has driven Japanese investment into the region’s re-
source-rich countries. Japanese trading companies such as Mitsubishi, 
Mitsui, Marubeni and Sumitomo have played a central role in facilitating the 
movement of LAC’s primary goods to Asian markets. In addition, to take ad-
vantages of strong consumption growth among emerging middle classes in 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, Japanese companies producing a 
variety of consumer goods ranging from cars to electronics to entertainment 
products and medical supplies also started to return to the region to invest 
(IDB, 2013).
At present, Japan’s FDI flows to LAC compare fairly well with those from Chi-
na. During 2010-2013, annual Japan’s FDI to LAC reached US$6.9 billion on 
average, compared with the Chinese FDI of US$10.7 billion (see Tables 1A 
and1B).4 According to ECLAC (2014), Japan has accounted for over 5% of 
the region’s total FDI inflows between 2008 and 2013. Japan’s FDI stock in 
LAC continues to grow and exceeds that of China, even when FDI to the “tax 
haven” countries (the Cayman and Virgin Islands) is included. Japanese FDI 
stock in LAC reached US$120 billion in 2013, US$15 billion more than the 
Chinese. Japan’s stock in Brazil remains high while that in Mexico continues 
to grow (Figures 7A and 7B). 
Table 1-A. Japan’ FDI Flows to major destinations in LAC 2010-2013
(In million US dollars)
Source: Author’s calculations based on official information of individual countries.
Table 1-B. China’s FDI flows to major destinations in LAC, 1990-2009, 2010- 2013
(In million US dollars)
Source: ECLAC Latin America and the Caribbean and China: Towards a new era in economic cooperation, Table 
III.5 P. 60. 
4 This set of data based on the information from official statistics provided by Latin American countries, 
which does not include flows from the financial centers of the Caribbean. 
2010 2011 2012 2013
Japan(A) World (B) (A)/(B)(%) Japan(A) World (B) (A)/(B)(%) Japan(A) World (B) (A)/(B)(%) Japan(A) World (B) (A)/(B)(%)
Argentina 187 13.546 1,4 384 20.826 1,8 186  18.231  1,0 503  15.034  3,3
Brazil 2.502 52.586 4,8 7.536 69.530 10,8 2.502  60.543  4,1 2.516  49.342  5,1
Chile 335 2.676 12,5 1.361 4.140 32,9 2.524  10.877  23,2 2.524  7.266  34,7
Colombia -13 6.899 -0,2 10 13.234 0,1 61  15.528  0,4 80  16.772  0,5
Mexico 225 20.708 1,1 686 19.554 3,5 1.812  17.224  10,5 1.538  35.188  4,4
Peru 40 1.751 2,3 6 559 1,1 4  420  1,0 0  201  0,0
Total of the 
6 countiries
3.276 98.166 3,3 9.983 127.843 7,8 7.089 122.823 5,8 7.161 123.803 5,8
1990-2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Argentina 143 3.100 2.450 600 120
Brazil 255 9.563 5.676 6.067 2.580
Chile na 5 0 76 19
Colombia 1.677 6 293 996 776
Ecuador 1.619 45 59 86 88
Guyana 1.000 na 15 na na
Mexico 146 9 2 74 15
Peru 2.262 84 829 1.307 4.626
Trinidad and 
Tobago
na na 850 na na
Venezuela 240 900 na na 1.400
LAC 7.342 13.712 10.175 9.206 9.624
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Figure 7. Japan’s FDI stock in LAC, Brazil and Mexico
(In million US dollars)
Japan, China and Korea: 
A. FDI stock in LAC 2001-2013 B. Japan’s FDI stock in Brazil and Mexico 1996-2014
  
Source: Table A: Author’s elaboration based on UNCTAD Bilateral FDI Statistics, Central Bank of Japan,  China 
Statistical Yearbook, Korea FDI Statistics database. Table B: Author’s elaboration based on information from 
Central Bank of Japan and JETRO FDI Statistics.
It should be reminded that all these figures are based on historical prices (not 
constant prices), so that Japanese FDI stock of long data is severely under-
estimated. Also, exchange rate fluctuations of recent years have not affected 
Japan’s FDI stock in LAC. Furthermore, as in the case of trade statistics, FDI 
flows from third countries, particularly from subsidiaries of Japanese firms in 
the United States are not included in these figures. This leads to a significant 
underestimation of investment by Japanese companies in the region.
More importantly, Japanese FDI has been far more diversified both in terms of 
sectors and in terms of host countries. When financial services are excluded, 
45% of Japan’s FDI stock in LAC is in manufacturing, a stark difference from 
China’s case (Figure 8). While China’s investment has gone overwhelmingly 
to natural resource sectors, Japanese FDI is evenly split among the manu-
facturing, services, and primary sectors. This means that Japanese firms are 
creating jobs and bringing new technologies in areas like cars in Mexico and 
ITC in Brazil.
Figure 8. Japan’s FDI stock in LAC, by major sectors, 2013: excluding financial services
(In million US dollars)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from Central Bank of Japan.
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The number of Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates operating overseas that 
participated in the 2013 survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (Japan METI, 2015) reached some 24,000 worldwide in 2013. 
These affiliates operated in a wide range of industries, and do not include 
those in the financial and insurance or real estate industries. Roughly, 66% of 
these (roughly 16,000 firms) were located in Asia, 33% in the Mainland China 
alone. Some 11% were operating in the three NIEs (Taiwan Province of China, 
Republic of Korea and Singapore), and another 17% in ASEAN (4).5 The cor-
responding figures for North America and the EU were much lower, 13% and 
10% of the total, respectively. At the same date, there were 1,251 affiliates of 
Japanese firms operating in LAC representing 5% of world total. Brazil (288), 
Mexico (269) and Panama (396) were the principal hosts for these firms.
By industry, worldwide, roughly 44% of Japanese affiliates were engaged in 
activities related to the manufacturing sector. Chemicals, communications 
equipment (ITC) and transport equipment were the top three sectors, followed 
by general and electric machinery, whose production bases have been primar-
ily found in Asia. Japan’s overwhelming presence in and around the machin-
ery industry in Asia reflects the buoyant and complex supply chains networks 
that have been developing in that region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
932 affiliates were operating in the non-manufacturing sector, mainly in trans-
portation and wholesale activities, and 319 in manufacturing, 125 of them in 
the production of transport equipment. The number of affiliates operating in 
natural-resource-related sectors was relatively small (Japan METI, 2015). 
The scale of business of Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates operating in LAC 
is gigantic: the total sales by these companies totaled some JPY$14 trillion 
(approximately US$143 billion) in 2013 alone.6 Although total sales were rel-
5  ASEAN (4) comprises of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
6 The sales are tabulated from the information by the companies who actually provided sales values to the 
survey. In the case of the Latin America and the Caribbean region, 908 companies, out of the total of 
1,251 (Japan METI, 2015) provided information on sales.
 Shutterstock.com
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atively small in comparison with those realized in Asia (and China in particu-
lar) and other regions, the total sales in LAC have been growing at a double 
digit annual rate during the 2004-2013 period (growth rates based on sales 
in yens), surpassed only by the growth rate for Mainland China (Figure 9A). 
For instance, total sales by Japanese companies in LAC grew faster than the 
figures corresponding to Asia as a whole or ASEAN (4). The foregoing indi-
cates that not only the LAC region has become an important target for the 
Japanese business community in recent years, but also that the nature of 
business carried out by the Japanese companies operating in this region is 
much more than globalized than Japan-Latin American bilateral trade statis-
tics might suggest.7
Figure 9. Sales by Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates operating in LAC, 2004-2013
(In percentages)
Total sales annual growth rates    Breakdown of total sales by market 
2004-2013    destination 2013
(annual average in terms of yens)
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration Based on information from Japan, METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of 
Japan) (2015), “kaigai jigyo katsudo kihon chosa” [Basic (trend) survey of overseas business activities] No. 44.
Furthermore, Japanese companies in LAC are export-oriented, thereby con-
tributing to foreign exchange earnings. In 2013, Over 53% (some US$75 bil-
lion) of total sales by Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates operating in the re-
gion were exported to third markets and 42% were destined to local markets, 
while re-exports to Japan were only 5% (see Figure 9B) (Japan METI, 2015). 
The marked orientation towards third markets is particularly strong for the au-
tomotive sector. Just to be sure, exports to third country markets by Japanese 
affiliates are not accounted for in Japanese trade statistics. From this perspec-
tive, the “third-market” orientation of the Japanese subsidiaries and affiliates 
is conducive to the creation of intra-industry trade and supply chain networks 
between, for example, Asia and Mexico, and between the United States and 
Mexico. This intra-industry trade experience can be replicated in Brazil and 
elsewhere in the LAC region.    
In addition to the sector diversification, Japanese FDI in LAC is conducive to 
employment creation. The most interesting aspect of Japan’s FDI is that Jap-
anese companies operating in LAC contributes to employment in some sec-
tors of the region in a substantial manner: the number of direct employment 
by Japanese firms in the region totaled some 250,000. Some 80% (202,000) 
of the employed by Japanese companies in LAC worked in the manufac-
turing sector some 100,000 posts belonged to the automotive sector. In the 
7  It is also important to keep in mind that incomes sourced abroad by these companies do not figure in 
Japan’s trade balance and thereby in the country’s GDP. Incomes from business aboard form a part of the 
current account and are thereby included in Japan’s Gross National Income, instead.  
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non-manufacturing sectors, transportation and wholesales were major em-
ployers (Japan METI, 2015).8 
As in the case of bilateral trade between Japan and LAC, Japan’s FDI, espe-
cially in energy, mining and infrastructure in the region, is often reinforced by 
the Japanese government in the form of loans from the Japan Bank of Interna-
tional Cooperation (JBIC), a government-owned lender, and to a lesser extent 
support from JICA to help develop infrastructure-related projects. These ef-
forts illustrate how investments from Japanese firms and government-to-gov-
ernment cooperation can be mutually reinforcing and beneficial.
Japanese finance to LAC
Japan has been a major source of development finance for the LAC re-
gion. Facing a high exposure to the debt crisis in the 1980s, the Government 
of Japan adopted specific policies to substantially increase official flows in 
the form of concessional and commercial loans to Latin American countries 
on a bilateral basis or through multilateral financial grants. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, these credits were used, in particular, to channel funds to support 
the structural adjustment programs and debt recycling. Both for the process 
of Latin American debt reduction in support of the Baker Initiative and Brady 
Plan as well as in support of the structural reforms, the EX-IM Bank of Japan9 
stood out: from the year 1987 onward, the Bank, often through co-financing 
with multilateral financial institutions, provided untied loans, equivalent to US 
$34 billion, of which more than US$7.5 billion were directed to LAC (ECLAC, 
1996). With regard to soft loans, the amount granted to the region steadily 
increased to reach a total of US $463 million in 1991, during which a series 
of projects related to the Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) were approved 
under the “Capital Recycling” program. 
As for loans with concessional elements more than 25%, the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), JBIC’s other predecessor, provided 
loans to foreign governments, as well as concessional loans and equity in-
vestments to private companies. The world-accumulated total of both cat-
egories for the fiscal year 1993 amounted to approximately US$67 billion, 
roughly half the World Bank Group and more than the combined total of 
the four regional development banks. Until that date, LAC received some 
US$6.6 billion of loans to governments, with 83 projects, while US$1.1 
billion in loans and investments to the private sector, with 174 projects, 
equivalent to 6.2% and 29.1%, respectively, of the world. Their majority 
were directed to the areas of transport infrastructure, energy and telecom-
munications, and agriculture. A novelty in the period 1992-1994 was that 
the granting of loans directed to the field of the environment of relatively 
high-income countries (ECLAC, 1996).
The present scale of JBIC’s operations in Latin America rivals those of ma-
jor multilateral institutions and Chinese banks. Although the rapid growth of 
lending to Latin America by the Chinese policy banks has outstripped that 
of JBIC in recent years, China’s stock of loans and investment in the region 
equals that of Japan, each estimated at US$100 billion by 2013 (Figure 10A 
and 10B). Latin America has accounted for 20% of JBIC’s annual outstand-
ing commitments on average in recent years (JBIC, 2014). JBIC loans, equity 
commitments and guarantees in the region exceeded US$10billion in Fiscal 
8 The employment figures are based on information by 694 Japanese companies who provided the corres-
ponding data to the 2013 survey (Japan METI, 2015).  
9 The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (its abbreviation is JBIC) was created on October 1, 1999, 
through the merger of the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (OECF). 
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Year 2012 (see Figure 10A),10 surpassing the World Bank support of US$6.6 
billion that year and nearing the US$11.4 billion pledged by the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
Figure 10A. JBIC commitments (loan, equity participation, guarantees) vs. Chinese Bank commitments 
(CDB, CHEXIM, BoC, Others) 2000-2013
(In billion US dollars)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from various JBIC Annual Reports, and Inter-American 
Dialogue (IAD), China- Latin America Financial Database.
Figure 10B. JBIC vs. Chinese Policy Banks (Loan and Investment Commitments) Stocks in LAC 2013
(In billion US dollars)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from various JBIC Annual Reports, and IAD China- Latin 
America Financial Database.
JBIC provides financial support for the international operations of Japanese 
companies with a particular aim to securing a supply of natural resources 
such as copper, oil, gas, and iron ore, a reason for which LAC has been a 
major target for JBIC. The Bank provides loan guarantees for resource-related 
deals between Japanese firms and governments in the region and also helps 
finance natural resource projects owned by Japanese firms or their subsidiar-
ies in LAC. In 2013, the Bank signed a loan agreement for expansion of one 
of Bolivia’s largest mines to support a Japanese company’s mine expansion 
project and the securing of a long-term stable supply of mineral resources. 
In the same year, the Bank signed a loan agreement for the acquisition of 
shares of companies engaged in agriculture and grain exports in Brazil to 
support several Japanese companies’ overseas M&As (JBIC Annual Report, 
2013, 2014). 
10  JBIC’s total commitment in loans, equity and guarantees to the LAC region amounted to 805 billion yens, 
approximately US$ 10.1 billion (at the annual average exchange rate of 79.8 yens to a dollar of 2012).     
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While a considerable percentage of JBIC overseas lending supports the ac-
quisition of energy and mineral resources by Japanese firms, Japan’s official 
loans to LAC also support manufacturing, which accounted for 34% of Japa-
nese FDI in the region during 2012. The recent examples include a loan for the 
manufacture of steel pipes for Mexico’s auto industry. In addition, JBIC supports 
infrastructure projects (a loan to the government of Sao Paulo state in Brazil to 
expand the Sao Paulo metro system). The Bank also signed a loan contract with 
Costa Rica’s state-owned bank to support the expansion of Japanese compa-
nies’ business with Costa Rica (JBIC Annual Report, 2013, 2014). 
JBIC has shown a strong disposition towards governments with market-friend-
ly economic policies. Brazil and the Pacific Alliance countries – Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico and Peru – have received a greater share of new loans in recent 
years, while finance to Argentina and Venezuela has dried up since the mid-
2000’s (Figure 11A). As indicated earlier in this report, Brazil, Mexico and Chile 
are Japan’s top trading partners in the region. For Chinese banks, Venezuela 
accounts for more than half of the accumulated commitments.
Figure 11. Country Distribution of Loan and Equity Participation Commitments, Accumulated as of March 
31 2014
(In billion US dollars)
A. JBIC B. Chinese Policy Banks
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from various JBIC Annual Reports, and IAD China-Latin 
America Financial Database.
It should be emphasized that JBIC’s and JICA’s contributions represent only 
a fraction of aggregate Japanese finance in Latin America. During the debt 
crisis of the 1980s, the exposure of Japanese commercial banks in the case 
of large Latin American debtors was only second to that of the US commercial 
banks. In September 1986, the cumulative debt of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile and Venezuela with Japanese banks reached US$28.6 billion (ECLAC, 
1990). In recent years, Japanese bank claims on Latin American countries 
are on a rise. Most overseas loans are issued by one of three Japanese me-
ga-banks: Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Groups, Mitsui Sumitomo Financial Group 
and Mizuho Financial Group.
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ODA AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE
The guiding principle behind the Japan’s ODA is that in order for devel-
oping countries to reap further benefits from world trade, trade liberalization 
alone is not enough; enhancing capacities on the supply side and assistance 
for that purpose would also be needed. This principle is enshrined in Japan’s 
ODA Charter, established in 1992 and revised in 2003. Japan considers that 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most efficient way for devel-
oping countries to further benefit from the multilateral trading system (OECD/
WTO, 2013). In this respect, Japan’s funding for the Aid for Trade (AfT) initia-
tives plays a significant supporting role in creating a better investment climate.
Significance of LAC in Japan’s ODA
Japanese ODA has had a major presence in the LAC region over de-
cades, while from the Japan’s perspective, Latin America and the Caribbean 
has been a relatively minor recipient. On the average in the 1980s and 1990s, 
LAC’s share in overall Japanese ODA remained around 8-9%. This percent-
age was considered low when compared with the corresponding share of 
Asia that absorbed over 60% of the Japanese ODA. 
However, it should be reminded that in terms of all ODA flows to LAC, Japan 
was one of the major donors among DAC member countries. During 1984-
1994, the accumulated Japanese ODA to the region reached US$7.1 billion. 
In the first three years of the 1990s, for example, Japan was ranked as the 
second largest donor, after the United States (ECLAC, 1996).
At present, Japanese ODA to LAC is modest in comparison to other donor 
nations. In 2013 alone, LAC accounted for 2.3% of JICA’s disbursement, 
with a total of US$277 million (Table 2). However, in terms of accumulated 
amounts, LAC was a target region for JICA’s loans, surpassing Africa (Fig-
ure 12). Of a world total of 3,225 cases, 325 were directed to LAC, while in 
terms of the amount granted, of a world total of US$295.4 billion, US$15.6 
billion were destined to the LAC region. Japan’s ODA profile varies widely 
from region to region, with emphasis on low-income nations in Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean.  
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Table 2. JICA disbursement Fiscal Year 2013 (ending March 31st), by aid type and by region
(In million US dollars and percentages)
Note: The original figures expressed in Japanese yens are converted in US dollars using the exchange rate of 
1US dollar = 102.27 yens. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on JICA Annual Report 2014.
The most important form of Japanese ODA that goes to the region has been 
technical cooperation, followed by government concessional loans (including 
those with a concessional element of less than 25%) and grants. Concession-
al loans are concentrated in Brazil, Mexico and Peru (JICA, 2014). Currently, 
technical cooperation and loans are dominant components. In Fiscal Year, 
2013, LAC’s share is higher for technical cooperation accounting for 8.4% of 
the world total, whereas that for loan aid is only 1.2%, and grant aid is 2.8% 
(Table 2). In 2013, the major JICA aid recipient countries were Peru, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Bolivia (see Figure 13).
Figure 12. Geographical Distribution of Accumulated Japanese ODA Loan (FY2013) by number of cases and 
amounts
(In percentages)
A. By number of cases B. By amount
 
Note: The original figures expressed in Japanese Yens are converted in US dollars using the exchange rate of 
1US dollars = 102.27 yens.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from JICA Statistics on Program Results 2014.
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Figure 13. JICA disbursement to LAC countries, Fiscal Year (as of March 31st ) 2013
(In million US dollars)
Note: The original figures expressed in Japanese Yens are converted in US dollars using the exchange rate of 
1US dollars = 102.27 yens.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on JICA Annual Report 2014.
Over the years, Japanese ODA has implemented projects of differing scale 
and scope in the LAC region. Priority issues and activities for Japan’s ODA 
in the region include, among others: i) improvement of economic infrastruc-
ture in order to pull out of the “Middle-Income Trap”; ii) renewable energy, 
environmental protection and improvement, and disaster prevention; and iii) 
assistance for mitigation of socioeconomic disparities from the perspective of 
human security (JICA, 2014). Examples include: the CORE (co-financing for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency) program with the IDB on geother-
mal and hydroelectric power generation and renewable energy and energy 
conservation in Central America and the Caribbean; and the Stand-By Emer-
gency Credit for Urgent Recovery; and disaster reduction and recovery efforts, 
both in Central America and the Caribbean.
Though the amount involved is modest, JICA has been carrying out the so-
called “The One Village One Product Movement” in LAC. These projects focus 
on enhancing local entrepreneurial capabilities, by developing one specific lo-
cal product in each rural area. As an example, JICA funded 11 projects in Pe-
ru’s different regions covering Piura, La Libertad, Huanuco, Amazonas, Puno 
and Cusco, with a total investment of approximately US$1 million. Currently, 
the construction of a plant and storage of frozen custard in the town of Calla-
huanca in Lima is underway (Mincetur, 2015). 
JICA is working on promoting support for the manufacturing industry and de-
veloping human resources in Mexico. A similar approach will also be applied 
in South America as well. One novelty of Japanese ODA is triangular and mac-
ro-regional cooperation, with an aim to promoting South-South cooperation 
(Central and South America as well as Africa and Asia) cooperation with four 
countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) and cooperation 
for a particular group of countries or regional integration framework (JICA, 
2014). JICA ties with Chilean institutions in triangular cooperation under the 
Japan-Chile Partnership Program.
JICA sees partnering with Japan’s private sector and local governments es-
sential in industry-related issues. Japan would use its ODA to build the neces-
sary production and distribution infrastructure (such as highways and ports) 
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and to promote technology transfer. As indicated earlier, Japanese technical 
cooperation has in fact played a central role in launching some of the region’s 
most successful export sectors such as the Cerrado Project in Brazil, which 
transformed this region into one of the world largest and most productive 
heartlands and enabled Brazil to become a world leader in exports of soy-
beans, maize and other grains (Hongo and Hosono, 2012). In Chile, Japanese 
technical assistance and financing through JICA helped develop the country’s 
salmon industry, which has grown to become one of the most competitive 
export sectors of the Chilean economy (Hosono, 2010). 
A more recent JICA’s example is the creation of agri-food chains and cluster 
in Paraguay (JICA/ECLAC, 2014). This project highlights how the technical as-
sistance and international cooperation efforts by JICA, in close collaboration 
with Paraguayan companies and public-private institutions, can contribute to 
major advances in the country’s development. The involvement of JICA in this 
project goes beyond simply executing cooperation projects; since its concep-
tion stage of the project, JICA has actively participated in the debate on the 
nation’s development strategy, based on strengthening production capacity 
with social inclusion, especially in the agricultural export sectors.    
Aid for Trade
The importance of the Aid for Trade (AfT) for Japan is clearly reflected in 
the ODA statistics. According to the OECD/DAC ODA database by sectors, 
Japan has been the first among the DAC member countries in the amount of 
aid in the production sector and the economic infrastructure and services sec-
tor. Japan alone provided approximately half (47%) of the total amount of the 
aid given by the DAC member countries in these sectors between 1990 and 
2004. In the agriculture, fishery and forestry sector, Japan also contributed 
almost 40% of the total ODA provided by the DAC member countries. These 
data reflect the fact that Japan attaches importance to development through 
trade in its assistance policy, especially as a part of the poverty reduction 
strategy through economic growth (OECD, 2007).
World annual disbursements of AfT funding increased by 53% between 2006 
and 2011. In total, US$174 billion in AfT was disbursed during this period. Ja-
pan was the largest donor, with disbursements of US$36 billion (21% of the to-
tal), followed by the United States with US$24 billion (13.8%), the World Bank 
with US$24 billion (13.7%), the European Union with US$16.3 billion (9.4 %) 
and Germany with US$14 billion (8%). However, the share of LAC in Japan’s 
AfT fund disbursement has been minimal: during 2009 and 2011, LAC re-
ceived only 2.8% of Japan’s total AfT funding (OECD, 2013). The majority was 
absorbed by Asia. In short, there exist vast opportunities for LAC countries in 
exploring Japan’s AfT funds. This, in turn, means that LAC countries should 
present convincing projects to be accepted by the Japanese authorities. 
In Asia, Japanese ODA played a decisive role in creating a favorable 
trade-cum-investment climate via the creation of infrastructure and the devel-
opment of human resources, which became a competitive advantage of that 
region relative to other geographical areas. In the case of LAC, there are other 
needs as well: not only for their economic and social development but also 
to promote the supply-chain and cluster development, as well as innovation 
and scientific and technological development with a view to participating more 
effectively in the global economy. Japan has fewer resources than before and 
needs to focus them on fewer projects in the region. In this sense, it is im-
portant for the regional economies to define better and convey their technical 
cooperation priorities and needs more explicitly to Japan, with a strong em-
phasis on the networking with Asian markets.
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BEYOND FREE TRADE: THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS (EPAS) PROMOTED BY JAPAN
The term “Economic Partnership Agreements” (EPA), instead of conven-
tional the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), points to some special features and 
characteristics of trade agreements signed by Japan. The EPA seeks to com-
plement trade and investment liberalization with facilitation and cooperation. 
While a major aim of the EPA is to assist and facilitate overseas operations 
of Japanese companies by improving business environment at home and 
abroad, its scope is wider than just commercial interests. The EPA comple-
ments ODA and other resources for cooperation. Japanese ODA is an im-
portant part of the cooperation provided under the EPA, but this cooperation 
is conceived within a broader context, with technical cooperation as the com-
mon denominator. 
Another distinctive feature of trade agreements signed by Japan is that all 
EPAs have clauses on inter-government-private sector cooperation: in each 
EPA, a committee is created to improve the business environment. This com-
mittee is composed of representatives of the respective governments and the 
private sector, so that the private sector can directly convey their interests, 
complaints and concerns to the Government of the other party. In this sense, 
Japan’s EPAs are “living agreements”: these agreements will be subject to 
improvement and upgrading, taking into account of the participating coun-
tries’ changing priorities and needs, as well as global and regional factors that 
affect trade and investment performance of each country.
On the whole, the EPAs with Mexico (2005) Chile (2007) and Peru (2012) have 
positive impacts on exports to Japan and investment from the Asian country. 
These agreements have not only reduced tariffs and other trade barriers but 
also encouraged FDI and established mechanisms for government-business 
cooperation on a wide range of issues. Trade benefits for the three Latin Amer-
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ican countries are substantial, but the impacts of these EPAs are more evident 
in the case of FDI flows. Japan’s FDI to Chile has equaled that to Brazil. Japa-
nese FDI destined to Mexico shows a strong growth in recent years.
The oldest EPA with Mexico stands out in this respect. Mexico negotiated with 
Japan with the intention that this should be the cornerstone of its strategy to 
expand and diversify trade and investment with the Asia-Pacific region. On the 
part of Japan, the agreement was its first “full-fledged” EPA after agreeing to 
open its agricultural sector. Besides, the EPA includes a specific chapter on 
cooperation involving eight areas; trade and investment promotion, support 
for support industries and SMEs, science and technology, technical and vo-
cational education and training, intellectual property, agriculture, tourism, and 
environment. Some of these are typically included in the FTAs signed with 
the United States as negotiation issues. Since its entry into force in 2005, the 
bilateral trade and investment flows have grown rapidly. As an example, the 
number of Japanese companies operating in Mexico has doubled from 399 
in 2009 to 814 in 2014. Some 160 firms are concentrated in the automobile 
sector alone (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).
In terms of trade flows, the Japan-Mexico EPA has impacted the most on Ja-
pan’s exports to Mexico, while the Japan-Chile EPA has encouraged Japan’s 
imports from Chile (see Figure 13). Japan’s exports to Mexico, which had 
continued to grow even before the signing of the EPA in 2005, fully recovered 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In the Japan-Mexico EPA, both countries 
agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs of products in the area of agriculture, for-
estry and fisheries, particularly five agricultural products (pork, orange juice, 
beef, chicken, and oranges) using tariff-quotas. Mexico committed to liberal-
ize the steel sector and the automobile sector. According to Ando and Urata 
(2011), Japan’s exports of finished cars, auto parts, base metals, electrical 
machinery and precision machinery have benefited from preferential tariffs 
offered by the EPA. 
Figure 13. Japan’s trade with the EPA partner countries (Chile, Mexico, Peru and Colombia*) 2000-2014
(In US million dollars)
A. Exports B. Imports
 
 
Note: */ Japan and Colombia are currently in negotiation.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Comtrade and other sources.
Chile’s exports to Japan have not been growing as fast as those to China, 
and their overall exports to Japan reached their peak in 2011 and have been 
declining since then (Figure 13). Under the EPA, the tariffs on Coho salmon 
and trout are to be eliminated by stages in 10 years after its entry in effect. 
The tariffs on wines (bottled) are to be eliminated by stages in 12 years. Tar-
iff quotas are set for agricultural products such as beef, pork and chicken. 
The tariff reduction/elimination schedule for forest and wood products (except 
plywood) is immediate for some products and gradual for others. As shown 
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in Figure 14, some products which have shown high growth rates during the 
period of 2009-2014 are precisely those that are contemplated in the liberal-
ization schedule.
Figure 14. Chilean exports to Japan by major product groups: Average annual variation 2014/2009
(In percentages)
Source: Author’s elaboration Based on information, Chile, Direcon (2015), el Informe annual: comercio exterior 
de Chile 2014-2015, Santiago, Chile.
Peru’s exports to Japan are modest when compared with those from Chile 
or Mexico, and overall bilateral trade has not grown as fast as expected even 
after the EPA going in effect in 2012. The Peruvian authorities expected that by 
signing an EPA with Japan, the privileged positon that Peru once had enjoyed 
some decades ago in the economic relations of Japan in South America would 
be reverted. The Japan-Peru EPA eliminates import tariffs for 99% of products 
bilaterally traded in 10 years. Among the products of Peru’s interest, almost all 
of mining sector is subject to immediate free access to the Japanese market. 
In the agricultural sector, Japan’s import tariffs are to be eliminated imme-
diately for fresh asparagus, wood and articles of wood. Customs duties for 
other products such as purple corn, giant corn and jumbo flying squid will be 
lowered as well. Japan excluded 749 tariff lines of sensitive products from the 
liberalization schedule (Gonzales-Vigil and Shimizu, 2012).
Peru is practically standstill in terms of overall exports to Japan. However, this 
hides some structural changes taking place. Though still predominant are the 
traditional sectors, some nontraditional products such as some agricultural 
and fisheries sectors have begun to penetrate the Japanese markets. Not only 
traditional products such as copper, lead and zinc, but also products such 
as mango, citrus, grape, coffee, asparagus, squid, fish oil, purple corn, gi-
ant maize from Cuzco, swordfish, among others, have entered the Japanese 
market under a preferential access. Three years after the entry in force the 
EPA, some 280 new products have found their “niche” markets in Japan. At 
present, there is great potential for avocados, as a result of the phytosanitary 
protocols for the access to the Japanese market approved March 5, 2015 
(Mincetur, 2015). More trade and investment opportunities can be expected 
when a more solid manufacturing base is created in Peru, into which Japa-
nese supply-chain networks can be incorporated.
Ten years after its entry into force, the Japan-Mexico EPA provides several 
lessons. One lesson is that it is possible to construct a positive trade and 
investment agenda with a strategic partner in Asia that is complementary 
to the Mexican development goals. Another is that it is possible to conquer 
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some “niches” in the sectors of natural resources in highly competitive Asian 
markets as the Japanese. Mexico’s EPA experiences also show that a Latin 
American country like Mexico is capable of engaging in supply chains in Asia 
and attracting investment and strengthening supporting industries, to become 
a top-notch producer and exporter, as in the automotive sector. Mexico has 
also learned to leverage public-private partnership (PPP) and various coopera-
tion schemes with Japan in innovation and competitiveness. 
Of course, there are problems. But the concerns and problems have been 
addressed in the bilateral committees mentioned above and renegotiation 
process of each EPA. In the case of Mexico, for example, it is desirable to 
increase Mexican exports to Japan via: i) increased use of the tariff-quotas 
already negotiated; ii) exports of more value-added and knowledge-content 
and attract FDI in sectors other than the automotive sector; and iii) articulate 
better Mexico’s cooperation agenda with different agencies in Japan (Mexico 
Secretaría de la Economía, 2008).
The Japan-Chile EPA also offers some lessons as well. Chile has been able 
to cultivate a market of world scale in some specific agricultural, fishery and 
forest products. In the area of tariff reduction/elimination, four years after its 
entry in force in 2011, about 82% of Chile’s exports to Japan entered duty free. 
In the same year, Chile granted 100% preferential tariffs to Japan for 77% of 
the products negotiated, and 90.7% of the total amount imported from Japan 
in 2011 entered the Chilean market duty-free. Four years after its entry in vigor, 
non-traditional exports penetrated the Japanese markets, and Japan trans-
formed into a major destination of non-copper Chilean exports; non-copper 
exports accounted for almost half of total exports by Chile to Japan by 2011. 
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On a negative side, the number of companies engaged in the bilateral trade was 
limited.11 In 2011, there was an issue of the full utilization of negotiated quotas; in 
2011, the pasta and tomato juices used the entire quotas allocated, meanwhile 
the pork used only 54.4% of the granted quota (Chile Direcon, 2012). 
There are some challenges for Japan, too. The liberalization rates (the per-
centage of the tariff lines which will be totally liberalized at the end of 10 years 
after the entry in force of the agreement) for the EPA with Mexico, Chile and 
Peru are 86.0%, 86.5%, and 87.0%, respectively, levels far below that of the 
TPP which aspires to reach 96% or higher. As it is well known, in Japan’s 
EPAs, tariff reduction in agriculture is significantly lower. This is compounded 
by the extended period of liberalization schedules with long lists of exemp-
tions; Peru (749), Chile (1200), Mexico (1300) (Gonzales-Vigil and Shimizu, 
2012).12 Undoubtedly, there is still room for further liberalization under these 
existing EPAs, which maintained significant barriers on certain tariff lines in 
which Latin American exporters are competitive, such as processed foods 
and agriculture products. High customs duties and tariff-quotas are likely to 
be renegotiated bilaterally with Japan. Some of these rates are also under 
negotiation in the framework of the TPP to which the three Latin American 
countries are members. 
Why a few Latin American countries have signed free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with extra-regional countries? One of the major reasons for signing a myriad of 
FTAs has been to seek better market access to major trading partners, by: i) 
consolidating the existing preferences available under the Generalized System 
of Preference (GSP); ii) eliminating tariff escalation or reducing tariff peaks or 
expanding tariff/quotas; iii) reducing risks of being prejudiced or left out in those 
markets against main competitors; and iv) seeking better market access for 
those products that are interests of developing countries, especially when the 
multilateral negotiations in the WTO framework have been slow or perceived 
less ambitious. Therefore, the major motivations for seeking an FTA with a de-
veloped trading partner are mainly of market access and are not necessarily 
conducive to structural transformation of the economy and its upgrading
By signing FTAs with major trading partners, Latin American countries have 
been able to avoid, to a large extent, the possibilities of trade diversion. The 
FTAs with major trading partners have also helped several Latin American 
countries to “lock-in” unilateral economic reforms and reduce the “country 
risk” and costs of external finance. Meanwhile, these Latin American countries 
also expected that the signing of FTAs with extra-regional trading partners 
would be conducive to: i) diversification of the export sector by product, mar-
ket and exporting firms; ii) generation of value-added and incorporation of 
knowledge-content in exports, not only in manufacturing but also services and 
natural-resource-related sectors; iii) upgrading of technological and innova-
tion capability; and iv) promotion of global and regional supply chains. How-
ever, these expectations have not been fulfilled up to now. Japanese EPAs try 
to go beyond these commerce-focused elements of the FTAs, by incorporat-
ing the development and cooperation dimensions to the agreements.
11 In 2011, 565 companies exported 432 products, compared to 2006, when 567 companies were expor-
ting. The same year, 3,128 Chilean companies imported 1,904 products from Japan, compared with 
3,130 companies in 2006. Of these, the top 10 companies accounted for 53% of total purchases in 2011 
(Chile, Direcon 2012).
12 The Japan-Chile and Japan-Peru EPAs still allow for tariffs imposed by Japan on 28% and 15% of product 
lines, respectively, even by 2020. In the case of the Japan-Mexico EPA, nearly 210 tariff lines, including 
certain meat, fruit juice, and leather products, remain subject to tariff-quotas imposed by Japan, while 
the Japan-Chile EPA retains tariff-quotas on nearly 30 product lines, mainly on meat and processed meat 
products (IAB 2013).
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TPP, RCEP AND THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE:  
THEIR IMPLICATIONSFOR JAPAN AND LAC
Recently, there has emerged a complex network of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
(see Figure 14). The recognition of the increasing complexity of the network of 
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, and the costs associated with that 
complexity, led the major economies of the region to consider the possibility 
of signing an agreement covering the entire region; the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship Agreement (TPP), or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (RCEP). Besides, it is important to remember that the negotiations 
of a trilateral FTA between China, Japan and Korea are underway. In addition, 
the negotiation of a bilateral FTA between China and Korea has been finalized. 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean should be aware of this “noodle 
bowl” problem and the ramifications for its proper region. 
Figure 15. Various integration initiatives in Asia-Pacific: in effect or negotiation
(As of September 2015)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on official information of the countries.
The RCEP, which fuses ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 in one initiative and merges 
the five “ASEAN+1” agreements in one scheme, appears, at least up to now, 
as an initiative limited only to the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, the TPP is, at 
least for now, limited to APEC members. There are still no formal established 
rules on the accession of new members to the TPP. All current members of the 
TPP negotiations are also members of APEC, and the current TPP participat-
ing countries have publicly stated that the expansion of membership is likely 
to focus on other APEC members first, such as the Republic of Korea and 
Chinese Taipei. Although some Latin American countries outside APEC with 
a strong orientation towards trade liberalization such as Colombia and Costa 
Rica have also expressed interest in joining the TPP, the moratorium on new 
members to the APEC practically eliminates this possibility for now.
The TPP will tend to displace the ASEAN as Asia’s integration axis. In addition, 
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those countries participating in the TPP (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and Vietnam) on the one hand, and the non-participating countries 
(Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar) on the other; and countries that 
have once manifested interests in joining the TPP but maintained an ambig-
uous posture until now (Philippines and Thailand). An eventual joining of the 
TPP by the Chinese Taipei should produce tensions with China. In this way, the 
TPP polarizes the ASEAN and even APEC. In short, the TPP means a change 
in focus and direction of integration in the Asia-Pacific, from the perspective 
of East and Southeast Asia to the Trans-Pacific. At the same time, being led 
by China, RCEP tends to weaken the centrality of ASEAN, which has been in 
the “driving seat” of Asia’s market-led integration. The TPP might make it even 
more difficult for the ASEAN to reach the goal of creating a single economic 
community by the end of 2015.
Similarly, the TPP tends to divide Latin America into two or three groups: i) 
APEC member countries (Chile, Mexico and Peru) vis-à-vis non-member 
countries that have officially expressed interest in joining the forum (Colombia 
and Costa Rica, among others); ii) the Pacific Alliance vis-à-vis the Mercosur; 
and iii) possible sub-divisions within the SICA, when and if Costa Rica and/or 
Panama decide to join. TPP is also likely to generate tensions between Malay-
sia and Vietnam on the one hand, and the CAFTA-DR agreement members 
on the other, with respect to market access and rules of origin in the textiles 
and clothing sectors. 
Under these circumstances, what are the options for the non-APEC Latin 
American countries with the Asia-Pacific? One way is to seek a bilateral FTA 
with every major partner in the Asia-Pacific. But this may not be a practical 
option for a small economy which does not have a critical mass before the 
mega-partners in the Asia-Pacific such as China and Japan. In this respect, 
given the economy’s size, a recently proposed Japan-Brazil EPA might be an 
exception. A more recommendable approach might be to seek greater inte-
gration with the Asia-Pacific, jointly by one of the following three ways:
 
i) Broadening and deepening of the Pacific Alliance as a negotiating group 
with several integration initiatives in the Asia-Pacific such as ASEAN or 
RCEP (if and when open accession is granted); 
ii) Further liberalization of trade within the APEC, through a free trade area 
of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) that could include other Latin American countries 
than Chile, Mexico and Peru; or
iii) Enlargement of the TPP, via the expansion of its geographic coverage 
for future negotiations by including other members of the Pacific Alliance. 
In each case, a leadership role of Chile, Mexico and Peru is essential. At the 
same time, Japan should support Colombia, Costa Rica and others in their quest 
for membership of APEC, and afterwards its possible association with the TPP.
Another set of initiatives that Japan could take on are more ambitious. One 
way is to deepen the existing EPAs with Chile, Mexico and Peru, through an 
amplified agreement in the framework of the Pacific Alliance (including Cos-
ta Rica, Panama). Another way is to search partnership with the Mercosur 
member countries or other sub-regions. In these cases, it is necessary to: i) 
increase the attractiveness of Japanese EPAs, by significantly improving mar-
ket access offers in agriculture, that at least equal those currently being nego-
tiated in the TPP framework; ii) publicize and propagate the merits of Japan’s 
EPAs, different from those signed by the United States, the European Union 
or China; and iii) continue deepening its relations with the Pacific Alliance and 
other regional integration entities.
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There have recently been two different trends in integration; “the Trans-Pacific 
Track” and “the East Asia Track” with a view to achieving the goal of a free trade 
area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). However, competition between the two results in 
a “competition of models or templates” regarding the modality of integration. 
Currently, “ the Trans-Pacific Track” led by the United States promotes the “TPP 
model” with a vison to put in place a template of regional trade liberalization 
under the banner of the 21st century. Meanwhile, the “East Asia Track” with ASE-
AN as its center promotes the “RCEP model” whose commitments are usually 
less comprehensive and stringent than those provided for under the TPP proj-
ect, while taking into consideration the aspects of special needs of developing 
member countries and the importance of cooperation for developing countries. 
The goals might be the same but the recipes are different.
Japan is the only Asian country that is participating in both TPP and RCEP. Ja-
pan is also part of the trilateral China/Japan/Korea agreement initiative, which 
is a key for an eventual RCEP. On the other hand, Japan has already in place 
an EPA with all the Pacific Alliance member countries (or negotiating an EPA 
with Colombia). The Japanese business community is interested in signing 
an EPA with Brazil. Under these circumstances, it is in Japan’s own interest 
to take initiatives, so that the country can act as a “bridge” between “the East 
Asia track” and “the Trans-Pacific track”, in a bid to facilitate development in 
both and at the same time to seek convergence between the two (Sugawara, 
2013). This can be achieved by keeping a strong foothold in both initiatives 
and the trilateral agreement negotiation. By doing so, Japan might be able to 
facilitate non-APEC Latin American countries’ engagement in both TPP and 
RCEP, or other schemes.  
At the same time, Japan should support Latin American countries for acces-
sion to RCEP when the membership is opened for extra-regional countries 
such as those from Latin America. In this way, it can be assured that the final 
goal of the FTAAP within APEC is achieved by either TPP or RCEP. With Japan 
assuming a leadership, an eventual RCEP will encourage ASEAN countries to 
set more ambitious targets for the coverage and depth of commitments than 
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those assumed so far in the “ASEAN + 1” agreements. Even in the course of 
negotiations under the RCEP, there might be a model (template) typical of an 
agreement covering the entire Asia Pacific region, with a strong emphasis on 
development cooperation.
For these reasons, it is also of Japan’s interest to promote greater trade and 
investment links between Asia-Pacific and non-APEC Latin American coun-
tries. Japan should act as interlocutor of non-APEC or non-TPP Latin Ameri-
can and Asian countries. Doing this, Japan can mitigate the “ASEAN Divide” 
that the TPP negotiating process is causing. Japan can also prevent ASEAN 
from losing its centrality in the Asia-Pacific integration process. 
ACTIONS AND POLICIES TO FURTHER ENHANCE JAPAN-LATIN 
AMERICAN RELATIONS
Strengthening commercial relations with Japan by applying reciprocal-
ly the public-private partnership (PPP) principle will assist LAC countries in 
addressing some structural problems and challenges of long data. Latin 
America’s production and export structure is still based on static comparative 
advantages than dynamic competitive ones. The region lags in innovation, 
R&D, education and infrastructure. Productivity lags are huge, and there are 
large productivity gaps between and within sectors in each country (ECLAC, 
2010b, 2012). Japan’s new approach focuses on diversification by products 
and firms and inclusive growth, promotion of clusters not only in manufactur-
ing but also in natural resources, and participation in global and regional value 
chains of enterprises of different size. 
Over a decade, Latin America has been witnessing three transformations in its 
commercial policy. One is the transformation of the strategy based on trade 
openness to internationalization of firms. The second is from trade and invest-
ment promotion to participation in global/regional value chains (GVC/RVC). 
And the third is from the FTA to Public and Private Partnership (PPP). With 
this new policy orientation, the emphasis on the FTA has changed accord-
ingly: i) from market access to participation in GVCs; ii) rules of origin not as 
restrictions but advantages, via accumulation of origin between several FTAs; 
iii) the need to strengthen goods-services-investment links; iv) from commod-
ity exports to technology and knowledge incorporated in natural-resources 
exports; and v) attracting FDI in natural resources to value-chains in natural 
resource sectors (Rosales, 2009). These policy changes not only point to vast 
possibilities that may lie ahead, but also lay the foundations for future region-
al cooperation with Japan, aimed at creating business alliances, enhancing 
cooperation in innovation and human capital in order to diversify trade, add 
greater value and knowledge to exports, and help create more stable and 
sustainable conditions for growth.
The EPA seeks to complement trade and investment liberalization with facilita-
tion and cooperation. Although a major aim of the EPA is to assist and facilitate 
overseas operations of Japanese companies by improving business environ-
ment at home and abroad, its scope goes beyond the domains of commercial 
interests. EPAs may be viewed as part and parcel of a policy of support for 
broadening production networks and value chains and for enhancing systemic 
competitiveness of the country and the region. In this way, the EPA comple-
ments ODA and other financial resources for cooperation. In sum, Japanese 
ODA is an important part of the cooperation provided for under the EPA. 
In order for Latin American countries to resort to and utilize the EPAs, Japan 
should enhance the attractiveness of these agreements, by significantly im-
proving market access offers in agriculture that equal those being negotiated 
in the TPP framework. At the same time, it is important for Japan to publi-
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cize and propagate the merits of the EPAs, which are different from the trade 
agreements signed by the United States, the European Union or China.
Together with the ODA, Japanese financial resources can play a decisive role 
in creating a favorable trade-cum-investment climate. This can be achieved 
via the creation of infrastructure and the development of human resources, 
supply-chain and cluster development, as well as innovation and scientific 
and technological development with a view to participating more effectively 
in the global economy. Japan’s ODA resources are limited and should be 
complemented by other Japanese financial resources public and private alike. 
This in turn requires that countries of the region set clear priorities and convey 
their technical cooperation and financial needs more explicitly to Japan.    
Japan is the world leader in the Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative. This program aims 
to raise the productivity and export competitiveness of developing countries. 
Functioning as an effective investment within the recipient countries, this aid 
enhances productivity, which improves the international competitiveness of 
their products and encourages more private investment; the growth in exports 
then accelerates economic development and eventually reduces poverty. This 
process has been widely observed in East Asian middle-income countries, 
which have historically been the focus of Japanese aid. Together with Africa, 
Asia has been the region that captures most Japan’s AfT funding. The same 
process can be replicated in lower middle-income countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Another area of mutual benefits is the strengthening of trilateral cooperation 
between Japan and the LAC countries. The trilateral cooperation format might 
be encouraged, especially when new regional integration initiatives such as 
the Pacific Alliance, which have a strong cooperation agenda, are gaining 
force. In the future, it would also be worth considering cooperation arrange-
ments that go beyond the region by including other extra-regional donors 
and recipients. The position of Japan as the main donor both in Asia and 
LAC should encourage new cooperation frameworks that might involve Asian 
countries like those of the ASEAN.
Concerning more efficient and coordinated exploitation of comparative ad-
vantages, a number of recent experiences show that value can be added to 
commodity exports and knowledge can also be incorporated. Although more 
difficult than in manufacturing sectors, it is also possible for Latin American 
firms to integrate commodities into production and marketing chains in the 
Asia-Pacific; this calls for a systemic approach that covers the production pro-
cess, trade logistics, sea and air transport, and marketing and distribution in 
the final consumption market. To this end, strategic partnerships should be 
created to increase value-added throughout the production and marketing 
chain, and mutually beneficial technological partnerships should be devel-
oped by applying, for example, advanced technologies in biotechnology to 
agro-industry, mining, forestry and fisheries. Japan offers vast experiences in 
these areas with Asian neighbor countries but also with some Latin American 
countries. These experiences can be replicated in LAC by the ODA and other 
financial resources. These areas are also good candidates for triangular co-
operation schemes with countries inside and outside the LAC region.  
Japan should act as a “bridge” between “the East Asia track” via the RCEP 
and “the Trans-Pacific track” by way of the TPP, toward the goal of realizing the 
FTAAP. By doing so, Japan might be able to facilitate non-APEC Latin Amer-
ican countries’ engagement in both TPP and RCEP. At the same time, Japan 
should support Latin American countries for their accession to RCEP when the 
membership is opened for extra-regional countries from Latin America. Even 
during the course of RCEP negotiations, Japan might seek a model (template) 
typical of an agreement covering the entire Asia Pacific region, with a strong 
emphasis on development cooperation. 
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It is of Japan’s own interest to promote greater trade and investment links 
between Asia-Pacific and non-APEC Latin American countries. Japan should 
act as interlocutor of non-APEC or non-TPP Latin American and Asian coun-
tries. Also, Japan should lead, once again, the reactivation process of FEAL-
AC (Forum of Latin America and East Asia Cooperation), the only forum that 
brings together all Latin American and Asia-Pacific countries, as a forum not 
for dialogue but for action on trade, investment and bi-regional cooperation.
One of the three approaches of Japan’s new development assistance strate-
gy, announced in February 2015, is “quality growth”. In order to achieve quality 
growth, Japan will take a leading role in promoting quality infrastructure invest-
ment, which is the first target under Goal 9 of the United Nations SDGs. Quali-
ty infrastructure projects, in the Japanese government view, are those that are 
user and environment friendly, safe and disaster resilient, and cost-effective 
in the long run. Quality infrastructure investments are those that fully respect 
each country’s development plan and enhance regional connectivity. Quality 
infrastructure cooperation creates jobs for local people and involves the trans-
fer of technology and skills. LAC’s deficiency in infrastructure has been identi-
fied as a major bottleneck for the region to close the gaps in productivity and 
competitiveness with other regions and thereby achieve sustainable develop-
ment. Establishing and/or strengthening public and private partnerships (PPP) 
with Japanese counterparts can help countries of the region to fill these gaps. 
The second approach that Japan is pursuing relates to the mainstreaming 
of disaster risk reduction in development. In Japan’s financing strategy for 
sustainable development, the effective use of limited resources is of critical 
importance. It is an indisputable fact that investing in disaster prevention and 
risk reduction is far less costly and more effective than responding after the 
disaster takes place. To describe this vision, the Japanese authorities have 
recently introduced the concept of “Build Back Better”. And the third point is 
on climate change. Between 2013 and 2014, Japan provided approximately 
US$ 20 billion from both public and private sources to developing countries 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In May, the Government of Ja-
pan and the Green Climate Fund signed an arrangement confirming Japan’s 
contribution of US$1.5 billion to the fund. The needs of LAC in disaster risk 
reduction and climate change are immediate but require long-term solutions. 
Japan has an excellent and proven record in both areas, and can provide 
technical expertise and financial resources.
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